Introduction
The early 1990s marked the end of the Cold War, which paralysed the United Nations from its inception. The event was a cause for celebration and hope. Following the historic Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction "among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the UN Charter-a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom '." 1 The spirit of this bold and idealistic statement had been echoed two years earlier by former President George H W Bush Sr's statement to the United Nations General Assembly as United States and coalition forces were gathering to push Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army out of Kuwait:
We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organisations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law … A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms. There are two main ways to ruin the UN: to ignore its relevance in war/peace situations, or to turn it into a rubber stamp for geopolitical operations of dubious status under international law or the UN Charter. Before September 11, Bush pursued the former approach; since then-by calling on the UN to provide the world's remaining superpower with its blessings for an unwarranted war-the latter.
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The crusade against terror is not a sole US enterprise; many of its fears are shared by a large majority of the international community. The crusade should however not be allowed to numb states and the broader international community to the need of international rule of law and the utility of international law as central pillars of the international community. The attempt by the "Bush administration to introduce a new principle of international law permitting 'preemptive strike' by a nation against another, solely at its own discretion, represents a quantum, and highly dangerous, innovation. Were such a principle to prevail, we would have reversed decades of advances, modest but hard won, toward peace-making and returned to an era of dominance through might." The "War on Terror" is a noble crusade that seeks to counter the rise of international terrorism fuelled by a combination of resurgent religious extremism, well-financed and co-ordinated terrorist organisations, and the availability of cheap weapons technology. However the pugnacity demonstrated by the Bush Administration in facing the threat is a source of concern. In profound insight, in 1999, Hubert Vedrine, then Foreign Minister of France, coined a new term describing the United States as a "hyper-puissance", or "hyper-power". The term wasn't an expression of awe but rather a fear of the capacity of the United States to resort to unilateralism in view of its dominant military and economic power. Perhaps the prophesy is coming true with events subsequent to the September 11 attacks painting a disturbing picture.
This Article seeks to sketch generally the issues that America's "for us or against us" attitude in the crusade against terror raises. Underpinning this commentary is the author's conviction that the US stance will have injurious consequences for world public order if the existing international system based on a tenuous rule of law-based framework is allowed to morph into a rule of might. The author acknowledges that there are many legal and political issues regarding post September 11 United States actions, but these have been analysed comprehensively by the author elsewhere. 6 In this Article, the author deliberately adopts a narrow perspective focusing on the danger that the overall tenor of United States' actions portends.
5 'To Paris, US Looks Like a "Hyperpower" ', International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1999 at 5. 6 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, 'Rushing to Break the Law? "The Bush Doctrine" of Pre-Emptive Strikes and The UN Charter Regime on The Use of Force', (2003) 1985) . 13 Over the last 30 years, the international community has negotiated 12 conventions covering terrorism.
approached from a conflict management perspective, rather than exclusively from a law enforcement viewpoint. The belief is that only the use of armed force will result in the degree of decisive action that will minimise the likelihood that offenders will go unpunished. It is argued that terrorists must be seen, not as criminals, but as persons jeopardizing national security.
14 With the end of the Cold War, acts generally described as "terrorism" proliferated in frequency and severity. The rise of globalisation and religious extremism on one hand, and the increasing accessibility and availability of weapons and technology on the other enabled well-financed and organised terrorist organisations to transform themselves into global outfits with greater reach and lethality. 15 The appeal of terrorism as a low-cost, relatively low-risk, activity with possibilities of high yield in terms of publicity, weakening of the victim or infliction of harm has always been the primary magnet to terror outfits. 16 Globalisation and technology was quickly enhancing the capabilities of the outfits. With less confrontation and more cooperation between states in the post-Cold War era, terrorism soon gained the recognition that Cold War ideological and political squabbles prevented it from gaining-a pernicious and underestimated threat to international peace and security.
There is no doubt that terrorism is an evil that States should combat aggressively. 
Changing Gear without Engaging International law
The devastating consequences of the attacks of September 11 led President George Bush Jr to declare a "war" on terrorism. The first stage of this war was a full-scale military operation in Afghanistan, which destroyed the Taliban and Al Qaeda as fighting forces, and replaced the Taliban regime with an internationally approved transition government. But the United States was soon squandering the legal and political capital when it turned its focus on Iraq.
"Operation Iraqi Freedom" generally lacked support by the UN and most sovereign states including some key traditional US allies.
The rapid fizzling of international support for the "Operation Iraqi" despite the abundance of the same when the United States launched "Operation Enduring Freedom" against Afghanistan was premised on what was viewed as a lack of appreciation by the United States of the complications to the international system that this engendered. This was more so considering that the United States had flagged that it was embarking on a new and dramatically different policy in dealing with terrorism than it has followed for many years.
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In his first Union of the Speech address after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mr Bush's bellicose remarks regarding the "axis of evil" raised international concerns that the war on terrorism may spread in terms of geography and nature. The international community (including United States' allies) "… reacted with alarm and repudiation, fearing that the president's rhetoric signalled a unilateral escalation of global tension. They also objected to to write into the rule book for the use of force may be willing to tolerate this situation.
Though the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have from a technical point of view "been fought and won, a battle still rages over the legitimacy of the United States' actions under international law. As the world hegemon, the actions of the United States receive a great deal of attention." 45 The United States chose not to act within the parameters of international law when it invaded Iraq without proper authority leaving the international community angry and frustrated. It did not help that the action occurred in the shadow of lowered world opinion of the United States due to its unilateral moves regarding the environment and missile defence. 46 The invasion of Iraq served only to reinforce the fears that the international community had of a hyper-power determined to have its way whether through law or simply raw power.
The anger of the international community was not based on any support for Saddam regime which the international community was well aware supported terror in one form or another.
Rather it was premised on the United States determination to invade Iraq based on faulty and dodgy intelligence which served to undermine the United States claim of a right to act unilaterally against Saddam's regime on behalf of the interests of the international community. In essence the United States seemed fixated with the need to get rid of the murderous regime-not a bad mindset-but disturbing when it sought to wrap up its political agenda together with the interests of the international community. The spill over effect is that it opened the door to other countries to justify violating the law in the same manner-by tying the interests of the international community together with national foreign policy goals. Thus, this move by the United States could unwittingly establish a dangerous precedent.
The Future
The events of September 11 establish that terrorism poses the most serious threat to international order and global human rights in the 21st century. Terrorism also represents a grave crime under international law. The war on terror has the UN Charter regime on the use of force enrolled in an era of change. Within the United Nations regime-the system of collective security, self-defence is subject to restrictions (in other words is finite). The "Bush Doctrine" and similar doctrines or justifications are running against the grain of Article 2(4).
Considering that an amendment to the UN Charter is near impossible, a change in customary law might be a way. As Professor M Bothe points out, "[a] usual procedure to modify customary law is to break it and to accompany the breach by a new legal claim." 47 The case for a change of the restrictive concept of pre-emptive self-defence is made by the National Security Strategy:
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.
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The argument that a state cannot wait to absorb a potential legal attack before acting is not new. Indeed, the traditional approach has always had the drawback of depriving a potential superpower. An essential argument for maintaining the restrictive concept is the problem of vagueness and the possibility of abuse since this is the greatest vulnerability of the prohibition of the use of force. The impossibility of placing any legal limit on the exception means that the validity of the prohibition of the use of force itself will be in jeopardy. It may well be that the international community is committed to reshaping the paradigm on the use of force to counter terrorism and will one day accept some instances of pre-emptive use of force. This it is submitted, is a much safer approach to the interpretation and development of the jus ad bellum than loosening any real restraint by boiling it down to a rule of reason-a self-destructive mechanism for the prohibition of the use of force. While there are serious doubts about the wisdom of the traditional rule which strictly limits anticipatory self-defence, practicable substantive legal restraints on the use of pre-emptive force are not readily available. Loosening these limits without setting out workable limits is dangerous.
Conclusion
Despite the horror of September 11, the "Bush Doctrine", if taken to its logical conclusion, is too all-encompassing to conform to even an expansive reading of the UN Charter. No doubt the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced the proposition that the UN Charter system is illequipped to deal with contemporary security threats. However part of the problem is a result of the Cold War and the obstructionist politics that accompanied it. 56 Despite instances of resort to military action to counter terrorism in the Cold War, the actions were often shrouded in a jumble of half-truths not helped by a confusing mish-mash of legal justifications. The end result is that the illusion of self-defence was (and still is) used and misused preventing the evolution of any meaningful state practice and opinio juris thus retarding the development of meaningful international discourse.
"Antiterrorism efforts must ultimately be judged by whether they prevent attacks. Any conceivable deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions of low-level conspirators is lessened by the fact that they take years to complete and may take place after additional attacks. Law enforcement activity cannot be expected to shut down terrorist organisations operating in hostile and uncooperative states…" 57 It is a reality that criminal prosecutions are generally ineffective in deterring fundamentalist terrorist groups able to recruit individuals willing to sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings. These terrorists are crazed killers, as prepared for sacrifice as good soldiers. 58 However n the face of the ever present reality that "Al Qaeda and similar organisations limit the damage any individual can inflict by functioning in loose-knit cells," 59 the fight against terrorism cannot be won purely by force or by causing the other side an unacceptable rate of casualties. Professor Christopher Blakesley cautions:
International and domestic law equip us to extricate ourselves from the 'infernal dialect' of violence; they provide the means whereby we may avoid accepting or participating in the oppression or the slaughter of innocents, even by our own acquiescence. It is error of the highest order to accept the ideologue's argument that, because some nations or rebel groups participate in oppression or other terror-violence, it is inevitable and therefore necessary to combat it with like conduct. It is practical and necessary to alter this vision. To commit evil acts because of perceived or even actual evil acts perpetrated by the object of our acts is to accept the evil as ours and to become evil. Self-defence under the rule of law does not include the use of innocents as tools. We must re-establish the vision of a world made up of human beings controlled by the rule of law and morality, not by raw power.
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The current climate dictates that there is a need "… to realign the existing rules on the use of force to match the altered international security environment and yet maintain meaningful limits on the use of force." 61 Viable solutions can be reached but only by States maintaining the centrality of the UN even in the face of unconventional threats.
The UN is well aware that it will remain relevant if it explores and develops new avenues for dealing with the threat of international terrorism. Obviously measures from another era that simply impose a limit on the use of force that frustrates a nation's ability to defend itself will result in the UN being marginalised as states will fall back on the expansive right of selfpreservation and inevitably place their own survival above adherence to an international law system that cannot guarantee their security and the safety of their citizens. The signs from the UN are good, patience and support for its efforts is what is needed.
60 Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism, above note 20 at 1080. 61 McLain, Settling the Score with Saddam, above note 42 at 291.
